THE MYTH OF DISCRETION: WHY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS
Do NOT RECEiVE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

John A. Zadrozny

The American government is unique among
the nations of the world, both past and present,
because of its use of the concept of federalism.
The essence of federalism is its constructive use of
repellent forces: by binding the various states to
each other via a central government, the perennial tendency of states to expand their power and
influence is kept in check, and liberties are thus
preserved in the process. Some maintain, however, that this delicate balance, however resilient
it may appear to be, is undermined greatly by
problematic institutions that do not embrace the
very rights the federalist system was supposedly
2
designed to protect.
A specific target of such critics is the electoral
college-the temporary assembly of individuals
that convenes in the December immediately after
the presidential election, pursuant to constitutional instructions, to choose the President of the
United States. 3 It has been criticized as being obsolete, 4 antithetical to democracy, 5 and misleading to voters. 6 While arguments abound on both
sides as to the continuing vitality of the electoral
college, 7 it can be definitively stated that the presidential electors who fill its ranks do not have any
First Amendment right to vote as they choose,
particularly if their choices are made contrary to
I

"The great virtue of the American structural constitu-

tional system of ... federalism is that it preserves liberty by

setting governmental power against itself." Steven G. Calabresi, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public Private Distinction: PoliticalParties as MediatingInstitutions,61 U. CHI. L. REv.
1479 (Fall 1994) [hereinafter CALABREsi].
2 See, e.g., Thomas M. Durbin, The Anachronistic Electoral
College: The Time for Reform, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 510, 512
(Oct. 1992) (discussing how the electoral college is contrary
to the "one person, one vote" principle favored by the Supreme Court) [hereinafter DURBIN]. But seeJUDITH BEST, THE

their respective states' mandates that electors adhere to the popular will.
This article will endeavor to explain why presidential electors' electoral college votes do not receive the First Amendment's protection of expression the way ordinary voters' election day ballots
do. Part I will briefly explore the creation of the
electoral college, its conceptual underpinnings,
and some of the basic perspectives of that oftmaligned institution and its relatively unknown
functionaries, the presidential electors. Part II will
review the Supreme Court's approach to voting
rights jurisprudence in general and its interrelation with the First Amendment. This section will
specifically note how the Court's recognition of a
right to vote has been tempered by an assortment
of justifiable restrictions of that right under the
compelling state interest standard. Part III will lay
out the constitutional, legal and traditional reasons why electors do not have a recognized independent role within the constitutional framework.
It will detail how electors have evolved over time
into at-will components of the electoral machinery. It will also explore the contemporary arguments both against and in favor of the electoral
college and explain why the views in favor present
a more cogent and realistic approach to the basic
3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I1, §1, cl. 2, which lays out the
mechanical requirements for the assembly and voting procedures of presidential electors.
4 See generally DURBIN, supra note 2.
5
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories
of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 213-14 (Fall

1997) (discussing how most Americans' expectations of
majoritarian rule are not truly mirrored by the electoral col-

lege) [hereinafter DENNING].
6 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton,
13 CONST. COMMENTARY 201, 203-04 (Summer 1996) (noting

CASE AGAINST DiiEcr ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE

that most Americans today believe they are voting for the

OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 125 (1971) (pointing out that
the "one person, one vote" principle is a judicial construct
that lacks constitutional support) [hereinafter BEST].

president and vice president rather than their electors).
7 Substantial discussion will be devoted to this topic in
Part III, infra.
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premise of our nation. Finally, Part IV will attempt
to weave all the disparate elements together in explaining why the First Amendment cannot override the other justifications for permitting states
to deny electors discretionary exercise of their
electoral college votes.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE

A.

A Brief Sketch of the Electoral College

The electoral college began inauspiciously
enough: during the summer of 1787, as the Constitutional Convention was nearing its end, those
present came upon a legitimate point of contention regarding the election of the president."
8 It is important to note that the wrangling over the presidential election process mirrored concerns about legislative
structure and apportionment, which was logical considering
that the number of electors was, as it is now, directly proportional to the total number of members in Congress. See
TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS

OF THE TWELFTH AMEND-

MENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC,

1787-

1804 8, 15 (1994) [hereinafter KURODA]. At the Convention,

the large states sought to have congressional apportionment
based on population alone, but the small states expressed
concern that such a scenario would make it easier for the
large states to marginalize the small ones. FORREST McDoNALD,

STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO,

1776-1876 16 (2000) [hereinafter McDONALD]. Conversely,
the large states opposed any scheme whereby the large and
small states would receive equal numbers of representatives,
as that would unfairly shift the balance in favor of the latter.
d. Recognizing the threat that such an imbalance posed to
the Union, convention attendees, including George Washington, favored a compromise to irreparable dissolution. See
ROGAN KERSH, DREAMS OF A MoRE PERFECT UNION 59 (2001).
The end result of this exchange was the bicameral legislature: representation would be based on popular distribution
in the House of Representatives, while each state would have
two representatives in the Senate. McDONALD, supra, at 16.
9 Compare Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J. L. & POLITICS 665, 676
(Fall 1996) (stating the viewpoint of those opposing direct
election) [hereinafter Ross &JOSEPHSON] with KURODA, supra
note 8, at 8. See also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28
(1892) (recalling that substantial debate occurred in 1787
over the means of choosing the president).
10 For an in-depth review of the competing concerns, see
generally Columbia Law Review, Note, State Power to Bind Presidential Electors, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 704-708 (Apr. 1965)

(proof discussing competing concerns) [hereinafter COLUMBA LAW REVIEW]. See also KURODA, supra note 8, at 7-15.
11 See Harvard Law Review Association, Note, Rethinking
the Electoral College Debate: The Framers,Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2528-29 (June 2001)
(providing the pro-direct election viewpoint and discussing
the nature and benefits of the "compromise" between the
camps) [hereinafter HARVARD LAW REVIEW]; McPherson, 146
U.S. at 28 (mentioning how the two camps "reconciled con-

While many favored having the newly-conceived
House of Representatives choose the head of the
executive branch, others favored direct election
by the people. 9 Each side had reservations about
the other's proposal,' 0 and a compromise was
struck: an electoral college would empower the
individual states to select their own presidential
electors, who in turn would convene in state
capitals across the nation and cast their ballots for
president and vice president." The electors
would be akin to an educated elite, and would be
capable of casting responsible votes for the lead12
ers of the United States.
In the years following that compromise, the
role of presidential elector changed dramatically
in part because of basic changes made by the
trariety of views" by agreeing to the electoral college).
12

While many at the convention were apprehensive

about having direct elections, it would be inaccurate to say
that all of these men distrusted the electorate. Specifically,
some were dissatisfied with the state of communications in
what was still largely a rural nation, and felt that only a discrete core of individuals could properly remain informed on
the broad field of issues and candidates. Ross & JOSEPHSON,

supra note 9, at 676.
It is also worth mentioning at this juncture that many who
favored the electoral college thought it would only rarely be
the final step in the presidential selection process. Many, like
Virginian George Mason, for example, figured that the vast
majority of elections would wind up in the House of Representatives simply because they anticipated a fractured electoral college vote. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN,
THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 26-27 (1972)

[hereinafter

LONGLEY

&

BRAUN]; COLUMBIA

LAW REVIEW,

supra note 10, at 707; and KURODA, supra note 8, at 19. Others
viewed the electoral college not as the mechanism for actually choosing the president, but as something more akin to a

nominating convention in preparation for the House's selection. LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 27. See also U.S.
CONST. art II, §1, cl.3 and U.S. CONST. amend. XII, which
explain the original and updated methods, respectively, of
how the House of Representatives would choose the president in the event the electoral vote failed to yield a majority
for one candidate. The "House contingency," as it is sometimes called, has only been used once since the passage of
the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. See Ann Althouse, Electoral

College Reform: Djd Vu, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 993, 997 (Spring

2001) (reviewing

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CON-

TINUITY; THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE
PARTY SYSTEM (1971),JUDITH

BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIREC-

TION ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTO-

RAL COLLEGE

(1971);

BRAUN, THE

POLITICS

LAWRENCE
OF

D.

LONGLEY

ELECTORAL

&

COLLEGE

ALAN

G.

REFORM

(1972)) [hereinafter ALTIioUSE]. In the election of 1824,
Democrat Andrew Jackson received both more popular votes
and more electoral votes than National Republican candidate John Quincy Adams, but because neither received the
requisite majority of electoral votes, the House ultimately selected Adams. See Will Hively, Math Against Tyranny, DisCOVER, Nov. 1996, at 75-76 [hereinafter Hively].

20031

The Myth of Discretion

states themselves. While the schemes used in the

first presidential election of 1788 varied

widely, 13

and continued to vary widely for some time,1 4 almost all of the states then in the Union had, by
the late 1820s, made the shift to having eligible
citizens within each state choose the entire slate
of electors, 15 presumably based on their positions
and the candidates they supported. Indeed, the
states had the exclusive right to create this bond
with the popular will, as the text of Article II of
the Constitution makes clear: "[e]ach State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
16
Congress."'
As the years passed, however, concern developed over what were perceived to be inherent
flaws of the electoral college. In 1824, for instance, Democrat Andrew Jackson was one of several candidates running for the presidency. 17 He
received both a majority of popular votes as well
as a majority of electoral votes,18 but because no
single candidate received a simple majority of all
electoral votes, the election became the responsibility of the House of Representatives. 19 After a
good deal of haranguing on Jackson's part, Na-

tional Republican candidate John Quincy Adams
20

tual winners of the presidential contest had won
the requisite number of electoral votes, but had
failed to receive more popular votes than their
nearest respective opponents. 2' More recently,
President George W. Bush won the presidency in
a similar fashion: his electoral vote total was sufficient for victory, despite his trailing of the Democratic candidate for president, Al Gore, by ap22
proximately a half million votes.
Competing Theories About the Vitality of
the Electoral College

B.

Critics were quick to point out that the electoral college was denying the voters their choice as
expressed on election day. 23 Some asked how the
United States, the home of democracy and freedom, could provide for the election of its leader
with a system that disputes the logic of majority
rule.

24

Those same critics have used an assortment of
arguments to justify the elimination of the electoral college altogether. A common theme sounded
among this camp is that the electoral college puts
presidents into office that do not reflect the
desires of the popular will as expressed on election day. 2 5 Some argue that the original justifica-

tions for the electoral college have since dissi-

received the most ballots and became President.
In the elections of 1876 and 1888, the two even-

pated, 26 or that new circumstances have come
27
into play that necessitate a different approach.

13
In 1788, only one state - Pennsylvania - successfully
allowed its citizens to vote for electors on a general ticket.
Several others permitted their citizens to vote for electors
under a district-based scheme. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 2930.
14 Schemes for choosing electors were still quite varied
leading up to 1800, despite the fact that the total of states
that had shifted to the popular vote method of choosing electors had risen to six. See id. at 30-32.
See id. at 32 (noting that "[a]fter 1832 electors were
15
chosen by the general ticket [i.e., via popular vote] in all the
states excepting South Carolina"). The Court goes on to state
that occasional reversions were made to having the legislature select electors, but this was sporadic and short-lived. Id.
at 32-33.

build up support for Adams in the House of Representatives.
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 36.

16

U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl.2.

See LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 36 and "EC
WebZine, 1824: Jackson Invents the Popular Will," available at
http://www.avagara.com/ec/ec_1824.htm (Sept. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter EC WebZine: Jackson].
18 See Hively, supra note 12, at 75-76.
19 See LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 36.
See EC WebZine: Jackson, supra note 17. Jackson's frus20
trations were not without justification. House Speaker Henry
Clay finished third in popular voting but fourth in electoral
votes, the latter of which rendered him ineligible to be selected by the House. Consequently, Clay used his clout to
17

These two elections will be discussed in greater detail
in Part III, infra.
See http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/
22
national.html (Sept. 22, 2002).
See, e.g., DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that the
23
possibility of electing a "minority" president has the effect of
subverting the popular will). The reader will note that comparable criticism arose in the wake of the 2000 presidential
election. See, e.g., Donna Britt, This College Is a Study In Nonsense, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2000, at B8 (stating derisively that
the Founders "designed a system to limit the popular will
that's still in fine working order").
24
See DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (discussing the "one
person, one vote" principle).
25
See id. (referencing the occurrence of "minority" presidents).
21

26

See, e.g.,

HARVARD LAW REVIEW,

supranote 11, at 2529-

30 (mentioning how two of the Founders' original goals in
choosing the electoral college - the recognition of slavery for
apportionment purposes and an uninformed populace - no
longer deserve consideration).
27
See id. at 2530 (discussing how the development of the
two-party system in the United States "has eviscerated most of
the features of the electoral college" that were justifiable
under a federalist scheme).
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Most of these critics call for a direct vote system,
which would replace the electoral college with a
mechanism that simply aggregates the popular
vote totals of the various presidential candidates
28
on a national scale.
One cannot discuss the electoral college without discussing the presidential electors that give it
effect. In fact, many critics of the electoral college
invoke the existence of presidential electors as
one of the primary reasons why the electoral college is a threat to democratic tendencies: they
note that the discretionary role of electors, preferred by the Founders, is a substantial obstacle to
guaranteeing that the people's will is carried
out. 29 Proponents of the electoral college, however, are quick to point out that electors no
longer possess the discretion they once did,3°1 provided one makes the assumption that such discretion was ever more than a theoretical issue. 3 ' Most
electoral college critics reject any view of electors
as non-discretionary, in no small part because
such a perspective weakens their calls for reform.

32

The perspective of electors as non-discretionary
actors in the presidential selection process is the
correct one, as will be demonstrated over the
course of the following sections. Before that analy28
See DURmN, supra note 2, at 516 (providing typical examples of what a direct vote system might look like) and
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 64-69.
29
See, e.g., DENNING, supra note 5, at 213 (discussing how

the enforcement mechanisms in place at the state level, assuming they are even constitutional, may not be enough to

keep electors bound to the popular vote);

COLUMBIA LAW RE-

supra note 10, at 703 (expressing uncertainty as to
whether statutes can constitutionally bind electors).
30
See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, supra note 10, at 70001 (noting that, the constitutionality of binding statutes
aside, the functions they perform do not come with the discretionary tendencies of other elected offices). See also
Thomas v. Cohen, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (noting the gradual historical evolution of the role of elector).
31
Some dispute the idea that everyone viewed electors as
discretionary at the nation's inception. One famous anecdote
tells the story of Federalist elector Samuel Miles. In 1796,
Miles allegedly rebuffed his party affiliation and voted for
Thomas Jefferson instead of John Adams. His defection
promptly triggered the following comment from an unknown Federalist contemporary: "Do I chuse Samuel Miles to
determine for me whether.John Adams or ThomasJefferson
shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think." See
BEST, supra note 2, at 39. See also KURODA, supra note 8, at II
(noting that "[n]o delegate [at the Constitutional Convention] argued that electors would be disinterested persons exercising their own judgment without reference to prevailing
opinion and interests in their states").
32
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector?, 104
VIEW,
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sis can begin, however, it is necessary to shift gears
and examine the Supreme Court's approach to
voting rights in general and the extent to which
limits can be placed on those rights.
II.

VOTING RIGHTS BASICS: AN
EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT
ELECTION JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. A Preamble of Pragmatism: Overriding the
First Amendment in Assorted Non-Election
Circumstances
The freedoms of expression, 33 association 34 and
petition 35 have been recognized repeatedly by the
Supreme Court as being essential to any society
that considers freedom and democracy to be
among its foremost virtues.3 6 It is equally well-established, however, that the First Amendment
confers no absolute rights upon American citizens, as its various protections are vulnerable to
co-option by those who would abuse the grant of
rights to violate the rights of others.3 7 It is with
this dilemma in mind that the Supreme Court has
carved out several prominent exceptions to the
rights granted by the First Amendment. While
W. VA. L. REV. 123, 125 (Fall 2001) (questioning whether
electors can constitutionally be bound by any law). See also
DURBIN, supra note 2, at 514 (pointing out that binding statutes were ineffective against the casting of faithless electoral
votes in recent past elections).
33 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting.., the
right of the people peaceably to assemble ...
Id.
3.5 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a re-

dress of grievances." Id.
36
See, e.g., Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (noting that "the
freedom to associate [has been recognized as] fundamental,"
particularly in the context of elections); Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (stating that "[t]here can no longer
be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form
of orderly group activity protected by the First [Amendment]") (internal quotations omitted); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (stating that "[t]he exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions cannot
constitutionally be obliterated" by state regulations) (internal
quotations omitted).
'17
See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502 (1949) (noting that conduct made illegal by the
state is not unconstitutional simply because the criminal activity involves elements of speech).
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they vary in terms of purpose and scope, they
share a commonality: all of the exceptions reflect
a sense that the First Amendment cannot be used
as a tool for infringing upon the rights of others.
The Court has recognized for some time now
that commercial ventures cannot utilize improper
business practices while simultaneously seeking
shelter under the First Amendment's protections. 38 The Court has said that commercial interests, while important, cannot be used to violate
laws that are reasonably tailored to promote public interests. 39 Similarly, the Court has forbidden
organizations such as unions from interfering
with business operations where the conduct of the
former was designed not to communicate some
message but to hinder another's commercial enterprise. 4° Such activities could not properly be

called speech, 4 1 particularly if the activities were
part of a larger scheme of behavior that had no
42
overarching speech component.
The Court has also stated that the mere characterization of something as speech does not necessarily make it so. 4 3 In instances where the govern-

desirable and seeks to impose restrictions, the
Court has upheld restrictive laws, provided those
44
laws are narrowly tailored to the interest sought.
Indeed, the Court even has gone so far as to say
that some instances of technical speech are impermissible because of the harm they might produce.

45

How can the Court justify these exceptions that
infringe upon rights clearly laid out in the First
Amendment? One way it has done so has been by
drawing a distinction between speech and conduct. 46 Whereas the former is usually found to be
deserving of greater deference, 47 the latter is
more often than not found to be deserving of
lesser deference for practical reasons: permitting
all conduct to be depicted as speech would make
it extremely difficult to craft any sort of effective
regulation. 48 Alternatively, the Court has been
willing to uphold regulations if they are deemed
to be content-neutral: if the negative impact on
expressive rights is deemed incidental to the regulatory goal, the regulation will usually be permit49
ted to stand.

ment is able to articulate that some activity is un38

See id. at 498 (rejecting the idea that "the constitu-

tional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute").
39
See, e.g., National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978) (noting that an
injunction against the petitioner "may impinge upon rights
that would otherwise be constitutionally protected").
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Retail Store
40
Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (noting that the prohibiting of picketing for unlawful purposes
was not violative of the First Amendment); Giboney, 336 U.S.
at 495-96 (proclaiming that "it is difficult to perceive how it
could be thought that these constitutional guaranties [i.e.,
those under the First Amendment] afford labor union members a peculiar immunity from laws against trade restraint").
41
See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 495-96.
42
See id. at 498 (stating that speech can be found illegal
if it is part of "a single and integrated course of conduct"
which has itself been made illegal).
43
See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968) (discussing the respondent's characterization of the
burning of his draft card as "protected 'symbolic speech'").
44 See id. at 382 (upholding the restrictive statute on the
ground that the government chose "appropriately narrow
means" for achieving its purpose of preserving draft certification); National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People v. Claiborne Hardware Company, 458 U.S. 886, 912
(1982) (noting that regulations which have only an "incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms may be justified in
certain narrowly defined instances").
45 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (rejecting claim that "fighting words" are de-

serving of First Amendment protection); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (rejecting claim that panic-inducing words, such as shouting fire in a theater, are deserving of First Amendment protection).
46
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)
(stating that "[t]he government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the
written or spoken word"); Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904
(2001) (noting that "expressive conduct receives significantly
less protection than pure speech") (emphasis in original).
For a broader discussion of the speech-conduct distinction,
see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
47
See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
48
See National Society of ProfessionalEngineers, 435 U.S. at
697 (stating that "[t]he First Amendment does not make
it... impossible ever to enforce [applicable criminal] laws");
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502 (declaring that "it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed").
See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135
49
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)) (noting that courts will apply a lighter standard of
review when "a regulation . . . serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression"). Some commentators believe that
the Court has frequently failed to steer clear of making content-based judgments. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 355 (May 1993) (noting that the
Court has "arguably strayed" from content-neutral decisionmaking) [hereinafter WINKLER].
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B.

Is There a Right to Vote? Textual Gaps and
the Court's Search For a Solution

In the voting rights context, the First Amendment's freedoms of association 50 and expression,'5 1 while not absolute, are quite strong, and
can be overcome only in instances where the government has both expressed a compelling interest
of some sort for a given statute or rule 52 and implemented regulations that are considered the
least restrictive of those basic rights. 53 The Supreme Court has had numerous occasions in the
post-civil rights era to address concerns over issues
54
such as voter expression and ballot access.
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Twenty-sixth 58 Amendments have all awarded spe59
cific groups within society the right to vote.
Some have consequently looked to the Four-

teenth Amendment's grant of equal protection to
fill this perceived constitutional gap. 60 Those that
have looked instead to the First Amendment's expansive protections view it as a more appropriate
guardian of the several values that are repre61
sented in the voting process.

C.

The Acceptance of Exceptions: Assorted
Areas Where Denials of Voting Rights and
Ballot Access Are Considered Constitutional

Despite the above tendencies of the Court, vot-

ing has always been at a distinct disadvantage

The expansive perspective of the franchise as

under First Amendment review because there is
no textual grant within that amendment protecting the right to vote, nor is there such a grant anywhere else in either the main body of the Consti55
tution or the remainder of the Bill of Rights.

laid out above is inappropriate, especially when
one considers that the Constitution itself makes
no such sweeping claim. This fact cannot easily be
dismissed, and it would be ill-advised for scholars
and citizens alike to envision a right where none is
clearly established. To the contrary, the Constitution does recognize that there are instances where
citizens may not be permitted to vote. 62 In keeping with the spirit of the constitutional text as a

Further complicating the voting equation is the
fact that all subsequent amendments addressing
the right to vote have been both positive and specific grants: the Fifteenth, 56 Nineteenth 57 and
50
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law.., prohibiting... the right of the people peaceably to
assemble").
51
See id. ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech").
52
See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)

(stating that, in burdening the electorate with some regulation, the state must provide a "demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation"); Illinois State Board of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (noting
that "[w]hen such vital individual rights are at stake, a State
must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a
compelling interest"); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736
(1974) (finding a candidate disaffiliation provision sufficient
because it "furthers the State's interest [which is] not only
permissible, but compelling").
53
See, e.g.,
Smith v. Board of Election Comm'rs for Chicago, 587 F.Supp. 1136, 1150 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (stating that
overly burdensome regulations will be struck down if "less
burdensome alternatives" are available); Illinois State Board of
Elections, 440 U.S. at 185 (requiring "that States adopt the
least drastic means to achieve their ends"); Kusper, 414 U.S. at
58-59 (commenting that "even when pursuing a legitimate
interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty"). See also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be
the touchstone in [areas] so closely touching our most precious freedoms").
54 The civil rights cases dealing with apportionment issues exceed the scope of this article. With a few exceptions,
the following cases discuss primarily First Amendment issues.
For an understanding of some of the racial and political
themes found throughout the early apportionment cases, see

generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
55 This premise, notwithstanding the recent "one person,
one vote" jurisprudence, was confirmed by the Court in the
pre-New Deal era. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178
(1874) (noting that "the Constitution of the United States
does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one"). While
the primary holding of Minor was rendered obsolete by the
Nineteenth Amendment, nothing in that amendment, nor in
any other amendment, has affected the accuracy of the above
statement.
56 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1.
57 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, §1.
58 "The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §1.
5" The Twenty-fourth Amendment is the one voting
rights amendment that does not grant a specific group the
right to vote. It does, however, award all American citizens
the positive right to vote without being burdened by poll
taxes or other pecuniary obstacles to the ballot box. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIV, §1.
60 See WINKLER, supra note 49, at 334.

61

See id.

Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example,
provides that states will suffer apportionment penalties for
denying eligible citizens the right to vote, excluding instances where the right to vote is denied to a citizen for his
"participation in rebellion, or other crime." U.S. CONST.
6-2
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whole, the Court has acknowledged that there are
circumstances where the federal and state governments could properly proscribe the right to
vote.

63

One such limitation that has not faced tremendous opposition is the requirement that only citizens of the United States be allowed to vote in
United States elections. While this sentiment is
not universal, 6 4 it is widely accepted in large part
because the several areas of the Constitution that
deal directly with extending or protecting the
franchise make mention of citizenship status as a
prerequisite for voting. 65 Other limitations that
have received express support from the Court are
residency requirements set forth by the individual
states and their political subdivisions.6 6 The
Court, in supporting such restrictive regulations,
appears to have justified the idea that a political
unit has the right to limit the franchise to those
individuals who have some sort of stake in the
well-being of that unit. 67 As a corollary, the Court

taken care to stress that content-based voting restrictions do not benefit from this specific grant of
power to the states. 68
Not all textual grants are universally embraced,
and occasionally, in instances where the Constitution permits something that would be deemed antithetical to a provision such as the First Amendment, the latter category usually finds itself on the
losing end of such struggles. In Richardson v. Ramirez,' for example, previously convicted felons
residing in California brought suit against the
state, challenging a provision of its constitution
which permitted the state to exclude ex-felons
from exercising their right to vote. 70 The California Supreme Court struck down the provision as
being a violation of equal protection, 7 1 but the

United States Supreme Court reversed, noting
that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly permits 72 the states to exclude individuals
convicted of rebellion or criminal activity, 73 notwithstanding the grant of equal protection estabThe Court found section 2 to

is willing to uphold regulations designed to exclude disinterested individuals, although it has

lished in section

amend. XIV, §2.
63
For example, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been interpreted by the Court as permitting the states to
impose restrictions on the franchise of convicted felons. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (noting
that section 2 is of "controlling significance" in allowing
states to exclude that portion of the population). For more
on Richardson, see infra.
64 Some individuals do in fact advocate the expansion of
voting rights to non-citizens. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Their
Chance to Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at C8 ("The circle
of political community must widen to take in all of those governed by the community's decisions").
65 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not

rently justify some of their voter restrictions by pointing toward the desire to maintain the integrity of the political
unit).
68 See, e.g., Carrington,380 U.S. at 91 (stating that any residency restrictions must be founded "on a nondiscriminatory
basis, and in accordance with the Constitution"). See also id.
at 94 (preventing states from excluding voters from exercising the franchise "because of the way they may vote"). Winkler notes that, despite the Court's statements in Carrington,
such decisions nevertheless run the risk of being rooted in
some evaluation of content. He points to the Richardson decision as an example of such an inevitability. WINKLER, supra
note 49, at 355-57.
69 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
70
Id. at 27.
71
Id.
72
It is important to note here that states are free to expand the availability of rights above the threshold established
by the Constitution. See, e.g., Manor v. Rakiey, 2 Mass. L. Rptr.
506 (1994). The Richardson Court was merely affirming that
states were well within constitutional boundaries if they
opted to adhere to the textual grant of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
73 The Fourteenth Amendment reaffirms that the voting
rights of citizens, "except for [those who have undertaken]
participation in rebellion, or other crime," are to be guarded for
the sake of apportionment of representatives. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, §2 (emphasis added).
74 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains the
following language: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1 (emphasis added). "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, §1 (emphasis added). "The
right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI, §1 (emphasis added).
66
See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.
60, 68-69 (1978) (noting that the Court's "cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately
restrict the right to participate in its political processes to
those who reside within its borders"). But see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 359-60 (1972) (warning that a residency
requirement lacking a sufficient bond to a compelling state
interest will fail under equal protection analysis).
67
See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 91 (declaring that the states
have "unquestioned power to impose reasonableresidence restrictions
of the availability of the ballot") (emphasis added). See also
WINKLER, supra note 49, at 342-43 (claiming that states cur-

1.74

75
be of "controlling significance" in this context

the United States; .. .nor [shall any State] deny to any per-

son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1.
75 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
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because it believed any interpretation that allowed section 1 to override section 2 ignored both
common sense 76 and basic principles of statutory
construction. 7 7 While the majority did not invoke
the First Amendment, the dissent did so implicitly, using its grant of freedom of expression as a
means of finding the latter's position untenable,
particularly given that California partially justified
78
the statute on qualitative grounds.
In much the same way that the voting rights of
ordinary citizens can be curtailed under specific
conditions, the rights of candidates to receive access to state or local ballots can be curtailed pending similar specific conditions. Indeed, both operate under the compelling state interest standard9
because the rights of voters to express themselves
and associate via the ballot box correspond to the
rights of candidates to associate, as a candidate,
with those who would vote for him.8 0
Williams v. Rhodes"' arguably represents the inception of a shift in favor of such reasonable restrictions. In anticipation of the 1968 presidential
election, two separate parties, the Ohio American
Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party,
sought to have their candidates for the offices of
presidential electors placed on the general election ballot in Ohio. Ohio had several candidate
registration requirements, the net effect of which
was to suppress minor party candidates; when one
of the two parties was denied access to the ballot
despite fulfilling the primary requirement, 2 each
76

See id. (noting that the Court's decision conformed

with both "the express language of §2" and "historical and
judicial interpretation" of the Fourteenth Amendment).
77
Id. at 55 ("[W]e ... rest on the demonstrably sound
proposition that §1 . . . could not have been meant to bar

outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly
exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which §2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement").
78
See id. at 81-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
the state's desire to deny ex-felons the franchise because of
how they might vote "strikes at the very heart of the democratic process," and that "[a] temporal majority could [improperly] use such a power to preserve inviolate its view of
the social order simply by disenfranchising those with different views"). See also WINKLER, supra note 49, at 355-57 (discussing how the Court's decisions in this area came close to
being impermissibly based on restriction of content).
79
The use of the phrase "compelling state interest" derives from Button, 371 U.S. at 438, but other cases have expressed identical or similar sentiments in different language.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("paramount"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960) ("subordinating"); and National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
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brought suit.83 In a consolidated decision, the

Court found the Ohio statute to be too burdensome and granted one of the parties the ballot access it requested.8 4 The Court cited both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 5 and ultimately
concluded that Ohio could not use the relatively
broad grant of power provided under Article II of
the Constitution to shield its stringent voter registration requirements.8 6
Superficially at least, this case could be viewed
as an emerging First Amendment protection for
both candidates and voters. The Court itself states
that voting benefits from numerous constitutional
protections8 7 should, as an expressive tool, retain
First Amendment protection because of the overlap between the right to associate and the right to
support association via the ballot box.8 8 The net
effect of this decision, however, was that it laid out
just how much leeway states have in the electoral
process, which in turn established boundaries
within which states could safely operate without
fear of judicial reprisal.
Primarily, the Court's focus on textual protections of the right to vote undermined potential
broader arguments that some amorphous nontextual basis could be used to protect voting
rights. In addition to citing the three major voting
rights amendments then in effect, the Court also
noted that although the states receive significant
regulatory power under constitutional provisions,
they are necessarily forbidden from "violat[ing]
son, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) ("substantiality").
80
Ballot access cases, while distinguishable in several respects from voter access cases, nevertheless share essential elements relevant to this analysis. Specifically, ballot access
cases emphasize that it is improper for a state regulation to
burden individual rights of expression and association absent
some sufficient and reasonable state justification.
81 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
82
See Williams, 393 U.S. at 24-26 (discussing the state's
fifteen percent signature requirement).
-" Id. at 24-28.
84 Id. at 34-35.
85
Id. at 30-31.
816 Id. at 29 ("we must reject the notion that Art. 1I, §1,
gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to
vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other
constitutional provisions").
87
See id. (noting that the Fifteenth, Nineteenth and
Twenty-fourth Amendments all provide specific protections
of the franchise). The Twenty-sixth Amendment, ratified
three years after the Willians decision, extended a similar
guarantee of the right to vote to citizens eighteen years of
age and older. U.S. CONST. amend XXV1, §1.
88 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
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other specific provisions of the Constitution."' 9 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court
elaborated on the idea that states were constitutionally permitted to establish limits on voting
under certain circumstances: it recognized that
states could impose restrictions on certain groups,
provided that those restrictions were not so burdensome or unreasonable as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of equal protection. 90
The Court's holding was essentially a recognition
that states could regulate in order to protect what
the Court referred to as "a compelling state interest."9 1 The Court was careful to reiterate that, despite the rejection of the statutes at issue, "the
State is left with broad powers to regulate voting."92
The shift initiated by Williams took time to fully
93
develop. Five years later, in Kusper v. Pontikes,
the Court struck down an Illinois statute that restricted voters' access to only one party's primaries within a twenty-three-month time frame, finding it "unduly restrictive" of a voter's opportunity
for choice because it "so impinge[d] upon freedom of association as to run afoul of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.

'94

It is notable, how-

ever, that the Court based its rejection of this statute on the ground that the means chosen by the
state was excessive; it was a rejection of degree
rather than of principle. 95 In Storer v. Brown,9 6 the
Court, supporting a California statute limiting access to one party's primaries based on prior membership in another party, noted that elections required regulatory supervision in order to ensure
89

Id. at 29 (emphasis added).

90

See id. at 30.

91 Id. at 31 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438). One noteworthy aspect of this decision, which will become more relevant later on, has to do with the concept of political stability.
In its argument, the state justified the statutes at issue on the
ground that they promoted political stability via a two-party
system. While the Court did reject the idea that a desire to

support the two major parties constituted a sufficient state
interest, it did not refute the broader notion that political
stability generally is a compelling state interest. Id. at 31-32.
92
Id. at 34.
93

414 U.S. 51 (1973).

94
See id. at 57. Note that many First Amendment claims
overlap with Fourteenth Amendment claims, primarily because of the latter's guarantee of equal protection. Occasionally, however, voting rights claims are argued solely on the
basis of the latter amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See
generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
95 See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58-59 (claiming that states "may
not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally
protected liberty"). In striking down the restrictive Illinois

basic fairness and honesty, and that such supervision would be analyzed in light of "the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the
interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
[extent of the burden imposed] .'97 This refinement revealed a degree of understanding deference that had been in shorter supply in the years
leading up to Williams. While the Court retained
its appreciation of the fundamental nature of the
myriad rights involved in the electoral process,
and made statements to that effect repeatedly,9s it
also recognized that states were, out of necessity,
permitted to install electoral restrictions as long
as they were able to demonstrate a compelling
need for those restrictions. 9 9
In the early 1980s, the jurisprudential landscape changed significantly once again with the
Court's decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze.100 In
1980, John B. Anderson sought to run for the
presidency of the United States as an independent. His attempt to be placed on the ballot in all
states met with particular difficulty in Ohio, which
had a statute that required independents to file
within the state by March to be eligible to be
placed on the ballot in the November general
election later that year. 10 1 Anderson filed suit, alleging that the burden placed on independent
candidates like himself was too great and far exceeded the corresponding state interest. The
Court agreed with the petitioner, noting that the
burden placed on Anderson and his supporters
"unquestionably outweigh [ed]" the state's interest
in ensuring that the independents on the general
statutes at issue, however, the Court clarified that what it
found objectionable was the extent of the restriction: the
twenty-three-month time frame had the net effect of preventing the respondent from switching party affiliation in time to

vote in a different party's primary. Id. at 60. The Court nevertheless supported the idea that states could establish reasonable limits on party registration to curtail party-raiding, or the

shifting from one party to another of non-loyal membership
whose sole goal is to alter primary outcomes in favor of their

original party. Id. at 59-60.
96
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
97 Id. at 730.

98 See, e.g., Illinois State Board of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184
(noting that the Court has "often reiterated that voting is of
the most fundamental significance under our constitutional
structure"). See also WINKLER, supra note 49, at 334 (confirming that voting and its associated rights derive from numerous sources within the Constitution).
99 Illinois State Board of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184.
100
101

460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Id. at 782-83.
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election ballot had broad-based support.10 2
To be sure, the Anderson Court found the statute under review to be too burdensome. Of primary importance in this case, however, was the
moderate standard the Court used to reach its decision. In analyzing the arguments presented, the
Court implicitly but clearly repudiated strict scrutiny as a practical standard in the First Amendment context by articulating that a case-by-case
balancing test was to be used whenever electoral
rights were at stake: courts were to "first consider
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the [First Amendment]" and contrast them to the "precise interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the
03
burden imposed" by the regulations at hand.1
The "character and magnitude" concept found its
way, in varying forms, into subsequent decisions
1 4
dealing with both voters' associational rights "
05
and candidates' ballot access rights.1
The Anderson Court had essentially come full
circle from the cases of the early 1960s dealing
with voting rights: it had dissolved what was basically a de facto strict scrutiny approach, as evidenced by cases like Williams and Kusper, and replaced it with a standard that permitted some burdening of voting rights in the presence of a compelling state interest. 00 Nine years would pass
before the Court, in Burdick v. Takushi,'o 7 expressly rejected the idea that strict scrutiny must
be applied in all instances where a voting regulaId. at 791-92, 806.
Id. at 789.
104
See, e.g., Smith, 587 F.Supp. at 1146 (quoting the
"character and magnitude" analysis of the Anderson decision
in justifying a balancing of citizen and state interests).
1115
See, e.g., Norman, 502 U.S. at 289 (requiring that the
102
103

"state interest [be] of compelling importance").
106 See id.

504 U.S. 428 (1992).
io8 Id. at 432 (noting that the "[p]etitioner proceed[ed]
from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any
burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny").
107

109

Id. at 433.

At least one commentator believes the Court has neglected legitimate First Amendment arguments in the context of voting cases. Adam Winkler decries what he sees as
the Court's overly "instrumental" approach, and favors a
more cohesive approach to voting rights jurisprudence, one
which combines the recognized instrumental approach with
the oft-ignored "constitutive" approach. It is this constitutive
approach which allows citizens to express themselves in nu110

merous ways via the ballot box. See generally WINKLER, supra

note 49.
Ill Part of the justification for the compelling interest
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tion is challenged, 0 8 under the premise that requiring such a high hurdle for regulation "would
tie the hands of States seeking" to provide reasonable boundaries and standards for their own elections. 109
Not all camps have embraced this rather permissive approach toward state regulation of elections. Some have taken issue with the Court's willingness to cede the expressive component of voting - and, by association, campaigning - in order

to ensure the efficacy and integrity of the electoral process.' "' Still, the Court's expressed standard has undoubtedly supplied clarity as states are
now on notice that they can solve perceived electoral problems in many instances without being
accused of violating basic constitutional principles
at every turn. "1'
III.

A.

WHY ELECTORS LACK DISCRETIONARY
VOTING POWER UNDER OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Federalism Lives On: Article II, The State
Autonomy Argument and Supportive
Federal Law

While it is agreed on all sides that presidential
electors owe their origin to the text of the Constitution,' 12 there is a lack of consensus on the issue
of how electors should be viewed." 3 Nevertheless,
a variety of factors, such as the explicit text of
approach most likely had to do with the potential strain on
government resources that would accompany application of
strict scrutiny. In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189 (1986), for instance, the Court said that states did not
have to provide "evidence" in support of their proactive voter
regulations: "To require States [to do so] would invariably
lead to endless court battles ....

Legislatures, we think,

should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in
the electoral process with foresight ...

sponse is reasonable ....
112

provided that the re-

" Id. at 195-196.

U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.

State courtjurisprudence is supportive of a claim that
presidential electors are state officers. For a sampling of
some of these decisions, see, e.g., State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 909 (Ohio 1948) (recognizing the right
of independent presidential electors to have their own names
included on the ballot, instead of via a short ballot); In re
State Question No. 137, 244 P. 806, 808 (Okla. 1926) (recognizing presidential electors as state officers).
Several scholars make the assertion that the electoral college is not a crucial element of federalist doctrine, and that it
cannot be explained as being one piece of the federalist puzzle. See, e.g., LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 84-85. They
essentially assert that the structure of Congress is sufficient to
protect the basic interests of federalism. Id. Such a viewpoint
113
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both the Constitution and federal law, historical
and judicial interpretation, and the basic federalist principles that support all of the above, favor
viewing electors as state officials properly under
the exclusive control of the respective states.
The Constitution, in the same clause that creates the office of presidential elector, establishes
that the states may appoint electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." 1 4 This
language permits a broad reading of states' abilities to select electors, and it is worth noting that
the only substantive limits placed on states in this5
area are located in other constitutional clauses.
There is only one qualitative limitation placed on
states in the area of the electoral college: the Constitution empowers Congress to set the times of
assembly of the electors. 116 Similarly, there is only
one quantitative limitation placed on states' abilities to determine electors: the number of electors
allotted to each state is determined not by each
individual state, but rather by the distribution of
the national population, as determined by decennial census,1 17 and the corresponding distribution
of congressional representation. 11 8
In addition, federal laws are currently in place
that further support states' unilateral rights to dictate the selection and, if necessary, dismissal of

electors, notwithstanding the fact that all states
currently tie electors' victories to the general election outcome voluntarily. 1 9 Title 3 of the United
States Code, which deals with varying aspects of
the presidency, is unambiguous in its deference to
the states. Section 2, for instance, provides that in
the event a state election fails to result in the elec-

is shortsighted, as it apparently sees no value in having the
president chosen according to a structure that mirrors the
federalist structure of Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.
114
115 The Constitution, for instance, specifically states that
"Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors,
and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day
shall be the same throughout the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. II, §1, cl. 4. Clause 2 of Article II, section 1 contains no
limiting language, other than that regarding the basis for apportionment. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.
116 "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their
Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 4.
"Representatives... shall be apportioned among the
117
several States ... according to their respective Numbers....

toral college has the effect of "giv[ing] more influence to
small states").
One tangential criticism of the electoral college has to do
with what one might call "census lag": since the electoral college (and congressional representation) is reapportioned
only every ten years, reapportionment does not occur frequently enough to keep pace with the shifting demographics
of the American population. The result is some states may be
wielding more clout than they technically deserve, since a
portion of the population that gave them their electoral vote
totals may have since moved out of state. Conversely, some
states that deserve more electoral clout are forced to wait until several years after a census, which deprives them of influence in presidential elections that occur in the year of a census. See DURBIN, supra note 2, at 513.
118
"Each State shall appoint.., a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives

The actual Enumeration shall be made ...

within every sub-

sequent Term of ten Years." U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3. The
base effect of this constitutional requirement is that, while
states can increase their total number of electors relative to
those of other states, they can never have less than three elec-

tors, since every state will always have two senators and at
least one member of the House of Representatives. This feature has been roundly criticized by those who feel small states
have a disproportionate advantage in the electoral college.
See, e.g., DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that "a small
state has an advantage over a large state as to the allocation
of the electoral votes"); HARvARD LAw REVIEW, supra note 11,
at 2533 (stating that the "Senate add-on feature" of the elec-

tion of presidential electors, "the electors may be ap-

pointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as
the legislatureof such State may direct."'120 The relevance of section 2 lies in its clear expression of
finality: it says that the state legislatures are the
final arbiters of which electors will ultimately represent them when it comes time for the electors
to cast their votes, subject only to the time constraints 2 1 set by Congress.
Section 4 is equally unambiguous. In providing
that "[e]ach State may, by law, provide for the filling of any vacancies which may occur in its college
of electors,"

2

2

it offers support to those who

would claim that states may constitutionally remove electors at will. First, it imposes only the requirement that removal be pursuant to some state
statute, presumably one that has already taken effect. 123 Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the passage proclaims that a state may fill "vacan24
cies which may occur in its college of electors."'

to which the State may be entitled in Congress

. . .

U.S.

CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.
119 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (noting that
states can voluntarily link the awarding of electoral votes to
the popular vote, but that they also reserve the right to undo
that link).
3 U.S.C. §2 (2000) (emphasis added).
120
See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 4.
121
3 U.S.C. §4 (2000).
122
123 This is known as the "safe harbor" provision, which is
part of 3 U.S.C. §5 and is discussed infra.
124 3 U.S.C. §4 (2000) (emphasis added).
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What this portion emphasizes is that, rather than
being a national body that would be accountable
to federal rules, the college is an internal state device governed by state rules. Such rules could
therefore reasonably and properly be established,
on a state-by-state basis, to restrict elector discretion.125

Additionally, sections 5 and 6 work in tandem
to support the notion that the states' decisions in
the elector selection process are conclusive. Section 5 contributes by reaffirming the role of the
state legislature: it provides that a state may, "by
laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors," come to a "final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the
appointment of all or any of the electors of such
State." 12 6 Section 6 buttresses section 5 by requiring the executive authority of the state to certify
the legislature's decision, 2 7 provided that its decision is based on a law in place six days prior to the
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Section 15 requires that "no electoral vote or votes
from any State which shall have been regularly given
by electors whose appointment has been lawfully
certified to according to section 6 of this title from
which but one return has been received shall be
rejected."' 29 This is essentially a requirement that
Congress accept a state's slate of electors that has
both met the safe harbor requirements of section
5 and is not challenged by another slate of electors. 13 0
B.

From Aristocratic Elite to At-Will Employee:
The Historical Evolution of the Role of
Presidential Electors

net effect of these two provisions is to emphasize
the basic premise of Article II: namely, that states,
via their legislatures, retain the ultimate ability to
appoint presidential electors, notwithstanding the
current popular vote connection.
The above provisions would all be useless without section 15, the absence of which would effectively empower Congress to make decisions as to
the propriety of the states' methods of selection.

Despite the electoral college's longevity, litigation dealing with the subject, which might have
served to guide states in how to draft appropriate
binding legislation, was non-existent during most
of the nineteenth century. More fundamental issues, such as the Civil War and Reconstruction,
pushed such constitutional niceties to the side. By
the 1890s, however, the issue had surfaced in the
legal arena, and it was not long thereafter that the
1 31
Supreme Court supplied a sought-after catalyst.
In 1892, the Court issued its decision in McPherson v. Blacker,132 the first to consider the constitu133
tionality of states' tools for choosing electors.
William McPherson and several other electors in
Michigan filed suit against the state, claiming that

125 For all the varying opinions regarding states' abilities
to restrict elector discretion, not even the most zealous proelectoral college advocate would claim that the Constitution
requires states to restrict elector discretion; they would merely
point out that the degree of control is best left to the states.
See COLUMBiA LAW REVIEW, supra note 10, at 709 (discussing
the role of state discretion in this area). Indeed, as some are
quick to note, there may still be circumstances under which
elector discretion would be desirable, such as when the winner of a presidential campaign dies prior to the assembly of
the electoral college in December. For an analysis of how this
succession problem could be overcome with simple federal
legislation, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 48
ARK. L. REv. 215 (1995).
126
3 U.S.C. §5 (2000) (emphasis added).
127 Id. §6.
128
Id. §5. This six-day requirement is the afore-mentioned safe harbor provision, which exists to ensure that a
state's electoral votes are not completely lost if there is an
ongoing dispute within the state prior to the assembly of the
electoral college. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 113.
129
3 U.S.C. §15 (2000) (emphasis added). The "one return" portion of section 15 does not effect the analysis here,
but it is worth noting that there has been at least one occasion where Congress had the difficult choice of choosing

account of how Congress dealt with the receipt of two different slates of electors from Hawaii after the 1960 election, see
BEST, supra note 2, at 195-96.
130 While many facets of the electoral college debate may
be considered infirm, there is at least some precedent regarding the "regularly given" requirement. In 1872, Democratic presidential candidate Horace Greeley died shortly after the general election. Most of his electors, having either
pledged to vote for him or honoring the wish of their respective state populations, cast their electoral votes for Greeley.
Congress, in undertaking the "regularly given" analysis, ultimately decided that votes cast for a deceased candidate could
not properly be accepted. See BEST, supra note 2, at 175-76.
131
While there is no textual support for this, it could
plausibly be stated that the rejuvenated interest in the subject
of elector independence was due to the election of 1888 and
its atypical outcome.
132
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
133
It is important to note that while McPherson was the
first Supreme Court case to address the constitutionality of
state mechanisms, it was not the first to discuss how electors
relate to the individual states. In In re Green, 134 U.S. 377
(1890), the Court declared that "Congress has never undertaken to interfere with the manner of appointing electors...
but has left these matters to the control of the States." Id. at
380. There will be more discussion of the state-elector con-

which slate of electors is the "regularly given" one. For an

nection infra.

assembly of electors in the state capitol.'
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its legislatively created scheme for appointing
electors according to vote tallies in several designated districts'3 4 violated the Constitution's grant
of power only to each state as a whole.' 35 In rejecting this approach, the Court invoked the plain
text of Article II: it noted that it was the "legislative power" of the state which controlled the selection of electors, and that there was no constitutional provision requiring the state to cede such
powers to the people. 13 6 In using such pointed
language, the Court was reaffirming the idea that
the states not only possessed "plenary authority"
to fill their allotted electors' spots however they
chose, 1 37 but also that states retained the authority to alter their chosen means of selection at any
38

time. 1

The McPherson Court set a powerful precedent,
which in turn encouraged a flurry of decisions justifying state revocation of elector authority when
deemed appropriate. In 1912, several electors
who had initially pledged to support the Republican Party's candidate for president in the state of
Nebraska, and were in fact nominated to run in
November on that premise, announced in the
wake of the national convention that they would
vote for the Progressive Party's candidate instead. 139 The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State ex
134
A district-based scheme typically divided a state into
portions equal in number to the total number of electors
that state was constitutionally allowed to receive. One consequence of this approach was that electors were chosen by
more discrete populations within the state. Today, only two
states, Maine and Nebraska, utilize this form of electoral vote
distribution. See DURBIN, supra note 2, at 513.
135
See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 24-25 ("[I]t is argued [by
the petitioners] that the appointment of electors by districts
is not an appointment by the State").
136 "The clause under consideration [i.e., Article 11] does
not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint, but
that 'each State shall;' .
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
137

Id.

Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. No. 43-395 (1873)) ("[the
power to appoint electors] is conferred upon the legislatures
138

of the States by the Constitution ....
Whatever provisions
may be made ... to choose electors by the people, there is no

doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power [to
select electors] at any time, for it can neither be taken away
nor abdicated").
139 State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 162 (Neb. 1912). A similar situation arose in Kansas, where several of that state's electors
were infuriated by Theodore Roosevelt's loss to William Howard Taft at the national convention, and the result was a substantial amount of legal and media commentary as to the
roles and responsibilities of electors. For one such in-depth
review of how things progressed in Kansas, see generally Ross
E. Davies, From the Bag: Faithless Electors of 1912: Arthur Wakel-

rel. Nebraska Republican State Central Committee v.
Wait,140 eventually sided with the state's Republican organization, noting both that the electors
were bound by their pledges to vote for the Republican candidate' 4' and that their representations in favor of the Progressive Party could be
viewed as abdications of their duties as Republi1 42
can electors.
More than twenty years after Wait, in Thomas v.
Cohen,14 3 the New York Supreme Court weighed

in on the place of presidential electors in the contemporary scheme. The petitioner was challenging New York state's use of the short ballot, which
did not list the names of individual electors but
rather listed the major party candidates for whom
the unnamed electors would vote. It was the petitioner's contention that he had an absolute constitutional right to vote for electors rather than
the presidential and vice presidential candidates. 14 4 The court rejected this claim in no uncertain terms, 1 45 and likewise rejected, in similar
terms, the associated claim that electors are free
agents unbound by party labels or general election results. 146 The court rooted its rejection of
the latter in the historical evolution of the role of
electors. 47 After providing a lengthy discussion
about presidential elections and the development
ing on the Kansas Electoral Case, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 179 (Winter
2001).
140
Wait, 138 N.W. at 162.
141
See id. (noting that the electors "pledged themselves
to discharge their duties ...

by voting for the candidates...

subsequently nominated by [the Republican Party]. We are
all agreed that any other construction would be farcical.").
142
See id. at 163 (discussing how the electors' representations should be viewed as effective resignations from their
posts as electors).
143 262 N.Y.S. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
144
Id. at 323. The short ballot's use has served in several
other instances to buttress the argument that electors are, at
least in present times, instruments of the people rather than
discretionary actors. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hawke v. Myers, 4
N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ohio 1936) (noting that the provisions of
Ohio law permitting use of the short ballot were not unconstitutional); and Storer, 415 U.S. at 738 n.9 (establishing that
the candidates for president and vice president had standing
in the present lawsuit, a position which impliedly marginalized the place of electors by reducing their prominence).
145
"Does section 1 of article 2 of the United States Constitution give the right to voters to vote for presidential electors? It does not." Thomas, 262 N.Y.S. at 323.
146
"No one has ever suggested that the choice [i.e., of
president and vice president] was not made on election day."
Id. at 325.
147
"We now have, and for a long time have had, a system
of popular balloting for individuals (electors) who have been
designated by the political parties for the sole purpose of vot-
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of the two-party system, 148 it went on to discuss
the corresponding evolution of voters' expectations:

The American people have grown to regard the
electoral college as a matter of minor importance.... So sacred and compelling is that obligation upon [the electors], so long has its observance been recognized by faithful performance,
so unexpected and destructive of order in our
land would be its violation, that the trust [given to
electors] has . . . ripened into a bounden duty - as
binding upon them as ifit were written into organic law

(emphasis added) .149
While the Thomas decision was both strongly
worded and pragmatic, its impact on the national
scene was minor for three likely reasons of varying
significance. First, the fervor for electoral reform,
then as much as now, inevitably died down with
the passing of the electoral cycle. Second, Thomas
was decided at the state level and may have lacked
the prominence that a federal forum might have
provided. 1 50 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, however, was the fact that most states had
already begun to embark on the path toward
some sort of electoral college reform. As is intimated by Wait, some states had already passed
statutes that required electors to pledge to sup15 1
port the nominees of their respective parties,
recognizing that parties were, in some respects, in
ing for those nominated for President and Vice President ....How did that change come about? It evolved." Id. at 324

(emphasis added).
148 Id. at 324-26.
149 Id. at 326.
15o These first two propositions are speculative on the author's part, but they seem more than plausible.
151
See, e.g., Wait, 138 N.W. at 161 (stating that "the
[state] legislature ... has deliberately and clearly recognized
the existence of political parties and attempted to delegate to
the members of each party the right to vote . . . for candi-

dates of their own party"). See also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,
219 n.4 (1952) (noting that Alabama's binding of electors to
party-mandated pledges was "not a unique delegation" and
citing at least ten other states that delegated to parties the
ability to bind electors).
152
See, e.g., Wait, 138 N.W. at 161. Other decisions and
commentaries recognize political parties as necessary players
on the modern American landscape, for better or for worse.
Compare Thomas, 262 N.Y.S. at 325 (discussing the development of parties' national conventions into "American institution[s]") and Ray, 343 U.S. at 220-21 ("political parties ...
were created by necessity, by the need to organize the rapidly
increasing population") with Ross &JosEPHSON, supra note 9,
at 676 (discussing how the rise of the party system was unanticipated by the founders and therefore incompatible with
the electoral college scheme) and HARVARD LAW REVIEW,
supra note 11, at 2542 (stating how "the Framers simply did
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the best position to ensure that electors abided by
the wishes of the electorate. 152 This final reason
probably goes a long way toward putting Thomas
in its proper context: it was concerned not with
the enforceability of states' restrictions on electors
but rather with the relationship between presidential electors and the voting public, the latter of
which was not really in dispute. Thomas was not
the decision that was to align all of the disparate
elements of the previous fifty years' worth ofjurisprudence regarding the elector's place in society.
Ray v. Blair 53 accomplished what Thomas was

not equipped to do. In Alabama, Edmund Blair
sought to be a presidential elector for the Democratic Party, but was denied an opportunity to run
for that office because of his refusal to submit to a
pledge 154 designed to ensure all Democratic electors would indeed vote for the eventual 1952 presidential ticket. State officials, as per statutory authority,1 55 refused to allow Blair to run, and Blair
filed for a writ of mandamus compelling Alabama's secretary of state to allow him on the ballot. 156

The Supreme Court of Alabama granted

the writ on the ground that the Constitution continued to confer discretionary power upon the
electors, 15 7 but the United States Supreme Court
reversed. 158 While the decision defended both po-

litical parties' abilities to bind electors through
pledges 159 and states' abilities to delegate that
not contemplate the existence of the modern two-party, democratically based, winner-take-all system").
153

343 U.S. 214 (1952).

The pledge in question read as follows: "By casting
this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this pri154

mary election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in

the ensuing general election." Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added).
155
The Court cited Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 17, §347, which
stated that "every state executive committee of a party shall have
the right, power and authority to fix andprescribe the ... qualifications of its own members, [and shall also] determine who shall
be entitled and qualified to [run for the office of elector]."
Ray, 343 U.S. at 217 n.2 (emphasis added).
156
Ray, 343 U.S. at 215.
157 Ray v. Blair, 57 So.2d 395, 398 (Ala. 1952). Alabama's
highest court anchored its view of electors' discretionary authority in the Twelfth Amendment, which, in its opinion, did
not compel obedience with party wishes but merely permitted or encouraged it. It went on to say that electors "should
be free to vote for another [i.e., someone other than the
party's nominee], as contemplated by" both the founders in
1787 and the drafters of the Twelfth Amendment. Id.
158 Ray, 343 U.S. at 231.
159 Id. at 220, 228-29. It is important to note that the
Court tread carefully here, stating that nothing in the Constitution forbid an elector from binding himself via a pre-convention pledge. Id. at 230.
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power via Article 11,160 Ray's most substantial contribution to the debate over presidential elector
status was its implicit acceptance of the idea that
specific performance could be available as a remedy should an elector defy the popular will as reflected on election day. It was here that the Court
made a syllogistic leap: if a political party could
bind its electors through pledges, and the state
could select its electors outright, it was therefore a
reasonable exercise of power for a state to bind its
electors via pledges or other mechanisms. 161 It followed, at least implicitly, that a violation of such a
pledge could permit some sort of equitable remedy, which, in this limited case, would be the negation of the so-called faithless vote - in other
words, one that does not conform to state requirements, be they to honor pledges or conform to
the popular vote - and the casting of a vote in line
162
with the pledge requirement.
Most states took the holding of Ray v. Blair to
heart, and began passing statutes that gave states a
variety of tools by which to bind presidential electors. One mechanism some states chose was a simple statutory declaration that electors will adhere
to the general election results. 163 Other states, an-

ticipating the problems that would arise from the
above's seeming lack of enforceability, implemented statutes that required electors to honor
pledges made to their respective parties. 164 Other
states chose an even more direct means, declaring
that the casting of a faithless vote triggered an automatic resignation on the part of that faithless
elector and a subsequent appointment of a new

160 The Court stated that the power to delegate derived
from Article II. If a state can unilaterally select its own electors without input from the electorate, it reasoned, it was not
impermissible for a state to legislatively delegate that selection power to a political organization. Id. at 227.
161
Id. at 227, 230. It is important to note that the Court
did not state this proposition in express terms; this may have
been due to the Court's desire to show some measure of deference, however slight and potentially symbolic, to the Alabama Supreme Court. Ross & JOSEPHSON, supra note 9, at
696.
162 The dissent reflected this implication in its statement
when it noted that the law at issue in the case "does no more

candidates under whose names he ran on the official election
ballot") (emphasis added), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3505.40
(Anderson 1996) ("A presidential elector... shall... cast his

than .. .make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary

general practice." Ray, 343 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Since the Ray decision, at least one
commentator has embraced the idea that presidential electors are bound under contract law. According to this theory,
electors have, in essence, contracted with the voters of a
given state, via express or implied statements, that they will
honor voter choice on election day. Consequently, any violation of this contractual arrangement could theoretically be
corrected via specific performance. Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Faithless Elector: A Contracts Problem, 38 LA. L. REV. 31, 32
(1977).
163 As of 1996, seventeen states used this type of statute.
State statutes that are representative of this type are CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. §14-304(5) (West 2001) ("Each presidential
elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this
state") (emphasis added), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9-176
(West 1989) ("Each ...elector shall cast his ballots for the

elector who would honor the obligation.

165

Re-

gardless of the nuance of category, these statutes
all had one thing in common: they codified, at
the state level, the assumption that states have total and absolute control over the qualitative aspects of electors' votes where electors ignore the
166
dictates of state law.

C.

The System Works Just Fine: Modern
Justifications for Preservation of the
Electoral College

While the role of the presidential elector has
evolved according to popular expectations, the
role of the electoral college itself has not. Notwithstanding the distinct voices in the pro- and
anti-electoral college camps, 16 7 its true value can

electoral vote for the nominees .

.

. of the political party

which certified him") (emphasis added), and Wis.
§7.75(2) (West 1996) ("[P] residential electors ...
by ballot for [the persons] who are ...

STAT. ANN.

shall vote

the candidates of the

political party which nominated them") (emphasis added).
164 As of 1996, nine states used this type of statute, although the language of their respective pledges varies. See
ALA. CODE §17-19-2(c) (1995), FLA. STAT. ANN. §103.021 (1)
(West 1996), MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 53, §8 (West Supp.
1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §29.71.020 (West 1993).
165 Three states currently use this type of statute: MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.47 (West 1989) ("Refusal orfailure to
vote for the candidates .

.

. appearing on the Michigan bal-

lot.., constitutes a resignationfrom the office of elector") (emphasis added), N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-212 (1995) ("[R]efusalor
failure to vote for the candidates of the political party which
nominated such elector shall constitute a resignation from the
office of elector [and] his vote shall not be recorded") (emphasis
added), and UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-13-304(3) (1995) ("Any
elector who casts an electoral ballot for a person not nominated by [his] party ...

is considered to have resigned ...

[and]

his vote may not be recorded") (emphasis added).
166 It is worth pointing out that no Court decision since
Ray has seen fit to counter that case's premise. In Williams,
for instance, the Court sidestepped the issue of state discretion regarding electors. Williams, 393 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
167
Compare, e.g., BEST, supra note 2, at 111-13 (supporting the maintenance of the electoral college) with LONCLEY &
BRAUN, supra note 12, at 66-68 (providing justification for re-
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be appreciated only when the American system as
a whole is considered. The electoral college provides balance among states with unequal populations, preserves unity that would be lacking under
a direct vote system, ensures that all presidents
have a distinctly national character, and protects
the electoral process from other assorted flaws
that would emerge under a direct vote system. Accordingly, presidential electors' adherence to
popular desires is instrumental in making sure
that these goals are achieved.
Despite the fact that there have been several occasions where presidential electors have cast their
votes in a faithless manner, 168 there has never

been a situation in American history where faithless electors were in the position to alter the outcome of a presidential election.' 6 9 There have
been, however, three elections in which the eventual winner of the presidential contest did not reform in the direction of a direct vote system).
168 There have been at least nine presidential elections
in which a person pledged to vote for a given candidate voted
for someone else; Samuel Miles was merely the first. See BEST,
supra note 2, at 39. In 1820, one elector pledged to vote for
James Monroe, who ran for re-election unopposed, voted instead for John Quincy Adams, allegedly to prevent Monroe
from matching President Washington's feat of unanimous reelection, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, supra note 10, at 701 n.41.
Seven subsequent elections reveal less noteworthy deviations:
in 1948, one elector voted for Governor Strom Thurmond
instead of Harry Truman; in 1956, one voted for Walter E.
Jones, an Alabama judge, instead of Adlai Stevenson; in 1960,
one voted for Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia instead of Richard Nixon; in 1968, one voted for Governor George C. Wallace instead of Nixon; in 1972, one voted for John Hospers,
the Libertarian Party candidate, instead of Nixon; in 1976,
one voted for Ronald Reagan instead of Gerald Ford; and in
1988, one voted for Senator Lloyd Bentsen instead of
Michael Dukakis. See DURBIN, supra note 2, at 514.
169 For a fictional but educational account of just how
such a scenario might unfold, see generally JEFF GREENFIELD,
THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE (1995). In the aftermath of the 2000
general election, concern (or hope, depending on one's political perspective) existed in many circles that faithless Republican electors could aid Al Gore by either casting their
electoral votes for him or withholding their votes from
George W. Bush, which would have had the net effect of
throwing the election into the House of Representatives. See
Charles Lane, Electors May Have the Last Word, WASH. POST,
November 9, 2000, at A31. Others were equally convinced
such a thing could never happen simply because of party loyalty and the elector screening process. See Edward Walsh, A
Quixotic Effort to Rally the 'Faithless'?, WASH. PosT, November
17, 2000, at A26. See also ATriOUSE, supra note 12, at 1011

(noting that the electors in this most recent election "stood
their ground, despite .

.

. pressure to earn a place in Ameri-

can history by changing his or her vote").
17o In addition to President George W. Bush, Presidents
Rutherford B. Hayes and Benjamin Harrison also did not receive popular vote majorities. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 2, at
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ceive a majority of the popular vote.' 70 While
some use these elections as examples of why the
electoral college should be eliminated, 17 1 a strong
argument can be made that these elections only
serve to support one of the original justifications
for the electoral college in the first place, namely,
that it permits election of a President whose support derives not just from the most people but
172
from the nation as a whole.
The electoral college, much like the bicameral
legislature, 173 was decided as being the means of
choosing the President, in no small part because
the small states were wary of being deprived of a
role in that process. 174 The elections of 1876 and
1888 reveal that the fears of the small states were
justified. In 1876, for example, New York Governor SamuelJ. Tilden won the popular contest by a
margin of more than 250,000 votes.'

75

Nonethe-

less, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won the
24-26. See supra note 12, for an explanation as to why Andrew
Jackson does not fit into this specific category.
171
See, e.g., DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (criticizing the
electoral college for permitting "the election of a 'minority'
president who has received fewer popular votes than a principal opponent"). See also HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 11,
at 2532-33 (pointing out that the electoral college could theoretically lead to the election of a president who received
only twenty-seven percent of the popular vote nationwide).
172
See, e.g., ALTHOUSE, supra note 12, at 1012 (boldly declaring that "the popular vote does not really embody the will
of the people"). While certainly a brazen statement, it is not
inaccurate: in reality, the electoral college reflects the will of
the people in fifty-one concurrent jurisdictions, the results of
which are aggregated subsequent to the general election. Id.
at 1011-12. Althouse notes that American citizens both have
grasped and approved of this distinction: "[P]eople understood that they were voting in fifty-one concurrent elections... [T] here was widespread acceptance of the structure
of the electoral college and even the House contingency." Id.
173
See supra note 8.
174
See, e.g., COLUMBIA Lxw REVIEW, supra note 10, at 70408 (explaining in detail the process by which the existing
electoral college framework came into being); HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, supra note 11, at 2528 (noting that "the Framers...
sought to negotiate between the competing interests of large
and small states"); DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (discussing
the "compromise plan whereby less populous states were assured of a minimum of three electoral votes [i.e., to reflect
the absolute minimum number of total members of Congress
a state can have]"). This fear is no less relevant today. Both
supporters and critics of the electoral college point out that
small states continue to have influence in presidential elections. Critics, however, maintain that this influence is excessively disproportionate. Compare generally, e.g., id. with ALTHOUSE, supra note 12.
175
But see BEST, supra note 2, at 25 (claiming that fraud
and other irregularities on both sides of the voting process in
1876 make it "difficult to assert with any confidence that
[Tilden] actually surpassed Hayes in the popular vote").
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election primarily because he captured all of the
electoral votes of key small states. 176 While other
factors impacted this particular election, 7 7 it
nonetheless illustrates that small states remained
an important component of any presidential election strategy and that candidates who ignore these
states did so at their peril.
The election of 1888 highlights a separate but
related justification for the existence of the electoral college: by forcing presidential candidates to
campaign in all states and forge a platform that
was nationally appealing, it made it almost impossible for a candidate to win the election with a
purely regional strategy. In that year, President
Grover Cleveland won the overall popular vote,
but many of these votes were attributable to lopsided tallies in several southern states. 1 78 Republican Benjamin Harrison won the election because
his lower popular vote tally translated into victories in a greater number of states, and thus conveyed the required electoral votes. Far from being
an abject failure of democracy, the electoral college prevented a candidate from winning office by
appealing to narrow, sectional interests instead of

that winning candidates have not only geographic
appeal but also ideological appeal. 18 0 Under most
direct vote plans proposed by electoral college opponents, a runoff election would occur if some established percentile threshold is not crossed by
one candidate, the reasoning being that the winner of a presidential election should have broadbased majority appeal rather than just being a statistical winner. 181 Proponents of the electoral college point out that such a scenario, while seemingly logical and straightforward, could possibly
have the opposite of the intended effect: a direct
vote system would serve as an incentive for more
and more moderate candidates to attempt to
force a runoff, thereby increasing the likelihood
that moderate candidates would split each other's
vote totals into insignificance. The seemingly contradictory net result of such a presidential freefor-all might be that two politically extreme candidates could find their way into the runoff election. 18 2 Such a potentiality lends credence to the

The lessons of elections past have been supported by contemporary studies and theories that
find substantial value in the electoral college.
First, several scholars have found that the electoral college promotes national unity by ensuring

argument that the electoral college provides more
stability than a direct vote scheme because it discourages moderate or independent candidates
8 3
without substantial support from running.'
Second, the electoral college keeps other undesirable forces in check. One perspective holds that
the electoral college provides a significant hedge
against fraudulent voting. The premise is quite
logical: under the electoral college system, the

Hayes won five of the Union's six smallest states
176
(Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont), losing only Delaware. He won the above states by margins varying from 51% to 69%. See "EC WebZine, 1876: Colorado Thwarts
the Popular Will," available at http://www.avagara.com/ec/
ec_1876.htm (inset) (Sept. 22, 2002).
177
Colorado complicated the equation in 1876. Colorado had only entered the Union as a state in August 1876,
and state officials opted to simply select the state's three electors, as they are permitted to do under Article II, rather than
hold elections. Hayes' one-vote majority in the electoral college proved to be the difference. Id.
President Cleveland's campaign strategy involved
178
pressing for a lower tariff, a position that was unpopular with
many Republican voters but was very popular with the agricultural Democrat South, which presumably hoped to reap
benefits from having markets opened overseas in reciprocation for the tariff reduction. "EC WebZine, 1888: Cleveland
Blunders His Way Out of a Job," available at http://
www.avagara.com/e-c/ec-1876.htm (inset) (Sept. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter EC WebZine: Cleveland]. See also BEST, supra note
2, at 70 (pointing out how Cleveland's "votes were not properly distributed because of his improvident political decision
to force the tariff issue").
179 EC WebZine: Cleveland, supra note 178. See also ALTHOUSE, supra note 12, at 1012 (expressing that "it is good to

deny candidates the option of accumulating too many votes
in one region while ignoring others"); BEST, supra note 2, at
70 (noting that "[t]he electoral-count system discriminates
against candidates who rely too heavily on a sectional base");
CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 1508-09 (stating that forcing candidates to run campaigns that are national in character prevents the unfair burdening of economic, political and social
minorities); HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 11, at 2543-44
(conceding that the electoral college is viewed by many as an
effective tool for encouraging "truly national campaigns");
Hively, supra note 12, at 80-81 (discussing how candidates
under a direct vote system would have the option of winning
by appealing to only the largest bloc of voters at the expense
of other groups, whereas the electoral college requires
broad-based, pluralistic approval).
180 See BEST, supra note 2, at 111-13.
181 See, e.g., HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 11, at 254445 (claiming that a direct election system is more in keeping
with the basic "one person, one vote" theme of equal protection jurisprudence); DURBIN, supra note 2, at 512 (pointing
out that "each person's vote in a state is not necessarily equal
to another person's vote in another state" under the electoral
college system). See also id. at 516 (discussing the mechanics
of a theoretical direct vote system).
See BEST, supra note 2, at 111-13.
182
See id. at 112.
183

1 79
the nation as a whole.
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possibility of fraud at the state and local level is no
less real, 18 4 but its occurrence is less likely to have
a substantial impact on the outcome in a given
state. 8 5 The very fact that such subversive techniques will have little effect is probably enough to
discourage such efforts most of the time.

18

6

If a

direct vote system were used in presidential elections, however, voter fraud and irregularities
would pose a more substantial problem because
of the cumulative effect of voter fraud: small episodes of fraud and irregularities nationwide
would be less detectible and thus would have a
8 7
dramatic and unwanted effect on an election.
Third, the electoral college encourages finality
and discourages contested outcomes. The vast
majority of presidential elections under the electoral college have yielded a winner whose electoral vote total far outstrips the popular vote; 8 this
is true even in elections where the popular vote
was extremely close. 189 This fact creates a very substantial obstacle to any candidate who seeks to
challenge the presumptive winner of a presidential election: since challenges to a presidential
election would usually have to occur in multiple
states,' 90 the challenger must carry a substantial
material, and perhaps even psychological, burden
in order to be successful. 191 The current electoral
structure forces candidates contemplating such a
challenge to weigh the likelihood of success
against the political stability and the good of the
See id. at 193.
See id. (noting that voter fraud only becomes a serious
issue within a state "when an election is very close").
186
See id. at 193-95.
187
See id. at 41-42, 193. See also ALTHOUSE, supra note 12,
at 1005-06 (attempting to depict the extensive problems that
would have arisen, under a direct vote scheme, if what happened in Florida in 2000 had happened in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia).
188 See BEST, supra note 2, at 191-92.
189
See id.
184
185

190

See id. at 192 (stating that a "losing candidate will not

contest the election tallies in individual states unless it is possible to reverse the results in enough individual states to give
him the election"). The election of 2000 was not the only one
where the electoral votes of one state were pivotal. In 1916,
President Woodrow Wilson won re-election, but just barely:
California's crucial electoral votes almost were won by his
challenger, former Supreme Court Justice Charles Evan
Hughes. Id.
191 See id. at 192-93 (stating how losing candidates would
probably have to challenge vote counts in numerous states in
order to overturn the results, except in the rarest of circumstances).
192
See id. at 193 (claiming that there "is a point [in every
election] where the interest in continuity in government
must prevail even over the interest in an absolutely accurate
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nation. 19 2 Under a direct vote system the above

forces of pragmatism and altruism are swept away:
all a candidate would need to do in order to contest an election would be to demand a recount of
the entire national popular vote.' 93 The situation
is further complicated if lesser candidates challenge the lead candidate's receipt of the threshold level of votes that would exist via a direct vote
system's theoretical runoff provision.19 4 It is easy
to envision the problems and delays that might
19 5
arise under such a system.

Finally, the electoral college is an effective tool
for battling voter apathy and encouraging voter
participation. Critics allege that the electoral col-

lege discourages voting and creates apathy among
the electorate, the thinking being that voters are
more likely to stay home on election day if they
believe their vote will be rendered meaningless by

a system that allegedly negates their votes. 196 Defenders of the electoral college, however, note
that the converse is true: the smaller voting pool
within a given state, and the value of that state's
electoral votes, make it more likely that voters will
show up at the polls because of the recognition of
their increased voting power. 19 7 Any direct vote
system would accordingly have a deleterious effect
on voter turnout, since an individual voter would
view his vote as one among hundreds of millions
rather than among a few million; the latter option
provides a greater likelihood that one's vote
result") (internal quotations omitted). See also id. at 194-95
(stating that "[t]he acceptability of the result to the defeated
candidate is the key to election certainty. Once the loser has
conceded ....

the continuity of government is assured").

19- See id. at 193 (pointing out how a direct vote system
would provide "greater incentive" for losing candidates to
call for recounts).
194 See id. at 196-97.
195
Best notes that the direct vote system would, depending on the specific circumstances of an election, probably
serve to encourage not one but two recounts, with the first
recount challenging the lead candidate's receipt of the requisite percentile threshold of votes and the second recount
challenging whether or not the lead candidate received the
most votes. Id. Best's hypotheticals reveal how chaotic the
post-election process could be under such a system, especially
when one considers that the time constraints would at worst
serve to conceal voter fraud and other irregularities and at
best encourage mistakes in the recount. Id. at 193, 195.
196
See id. at 130-31 (citing how direct vote proponents
believe it would stimulate voter participation). See also id. at
132-33 (criticizing one scholar's assertion that votes under
the electoral scheme are "lost," which in turn discourages
voter participation).
197
See Hively, supra note 12, at 81-84 (examining in detail how individual votes are strengthened by the electoral
college).
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would have an impact. 198
The above arguments do not represent the entirety of the debate, but they provide a solid crosssection of the competing viewpoints. Regardless
of where one falls in the above debate, however, a
strong argument can be made that the effectiveness of the electoral college hinges on electors'
compliance with the laws of their respective states.
The arguments supplied on behalf of justifying
the electoral college disintegrate if predictability
disappears.
IV.

NO FREE SPEECH HAVEN: THE
COMPELLING REASONS WHY
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS DO NOT
BENEFIT FROM FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION

Whereas the previous parts of this note have examined varying aspects of the role of presidential
elector, this Section will assert how the earlier
components work together to foreclose any possibility that presidential electors can properly exercise a discretionary function. Succinctly, a combination of undeniably explicit texts, long-standing
judicial interpretation and equally long-standing
popular expectations serve to paint a picture of
electors who are both beholden to the states and
required to vote as state laws provide.
First, there is nothing in the Constitution, in Article II or other areas, that speaks to the issue of
elector discretion, and such silence invariably
works in favor of permitting the states to pass
binding statutes that remove elector discretion
from the equation. 199 What little historians and legal scholars purport to know about the intended
role of electors comes from anecdotal and
secondhand accounts. 2 0 0 Even that sparse amount
of information is subject to scrutiny. 20' From a
198 See id. See also BEST, supra note 2, at 131 (disputing the
idea that the electoral college discourages voter participation
with voter turnout statistics).
199 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl.2. See also Bush, 531 U.S.
at 104 (confirming that the states' power to select electors is

"plenary").
200 See, e.g.,
LONGLEY & BRAUN, supra note 12, at 29-30
(discussing how the system eventually forced electors into positions of subservience to the electorate, which was allegedly

not anticipated by the Founders).
201 See BEST, supra note 2, at 39 (revealing that sentiment

existed among some, even in the years immediately after ratification, that electors were not discretionary actors).
202 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2. See also McPherson, 146
U.S. at 25 (noting that the state legislature is the "supreme

textual standpoint, Article II is firm in its assertion
that the legislatures of the respective states represent the final authorities when it comes to the
rules guiding the selection of electors. 20 2 That
precisely carved role is modified by only two other
constitutional provisions: one that gives Congress
the authority to set the time of assembly for electors20

3

and the other that determines apportion-

ment of electors to the states according to their
20 4
populations as determined by census.
Second, the federal statutes dealing with the
electoral college generally, and the presidential
electors specifically, support this broad interpretation of the power granted to the states.20 5 These
federal statutes echo the notion, firmly stated in
Article II, that the states were to exercise their authority under the Constitution to select electors as
they saw fit,20 6 and that their authority to do so
was unequivocally plenary and not subject to the
scrutiny of Congress.2 0 7 Of particular importance
here is the safe harbor feature of 3 U.S.C. § 5,
which mandates that Congress accept electors
who are selected pursuant to state law, provided
that those electors were selected according to laws
in place six days prior to the assembly of the electoral college. 20

This is relevant not only because

it instructs that Congress accept what the states
have offered, 20

9

but also because it makes no

mention of what is or is not permissible content of
such state laws. This silence, in conjunction with
the grant of wide latitude under Article II, permits
a reading that allows states to statutorily bind
their electors.
Third, strong judicial precedents concerning
presidential electors have almost unanimously
supported states in their assertions that electors,
and the processes that govern their selection, are
the sole domain of the respective states. 2 10 Some
state court rulings have held that presidential
authority" when it comes to selecting electors).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 3.
203
204
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §2, cl. 3.
205
See generally 3 U.S.C. §§2, 4-6, 15 (2000).
206
See id. §2.
See id. §5.
207
208
See id. §2. See also Bush, 531 U.S. at 113 (stating how
the judicial decisions made after the general election cannot
"frustrate the legislative desire to attain the 'safe harbor' provided by §5").
209
See 3 U.S.C. §15 (2000) (outlining procedures for ac-

cepting and counting electoral votes in Congress).
210
See, e.g., McPherson, 146 U.S. at 26-27 (discussing "plenary authority").
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electors are state officers 2 1 and can be presented
to the electorate in any fashion that the state
chooses. 21 2 Other state court rulings have ex-

pressed the belief that electors have come to serve
a ministerial role. 21 3 Most notably, on the one occasion when it was called upon to address the subject, the Supreme Court confirmed not only that
states could bind electors and that such power derived from the broad grant of authority explicitly
provided in Article 11,214 but also implied that an
elector who did not vote in accordance with the
wishes of a state's legislature risked having his
vote overturned. 21 5 Such decisions have left little

room for an alternative

reading. What has

emerged from these decisions is an image of electors as apolitical agents, since it can reasonably be

stated that they are giving effect to political expression that occurred at an earlier time - on
election day - by individuals who certainly deserve
2 16
First Amendment protection.
Fourth, even absent the above body of judicial
precedent, the current Supreme Court would
likely uphold state statutes that bind presidential
electors were it to apply the compelling state interest standard it has utilized in other voting
rights cases. 2 17 Important societal interests, such
as fair and effective elections, 218 political stability,2 1 9 legitimacy of the eventual winner 22 °1and the
211
See Walker, 93 F.2d at 388 (supporting the contention
that electors are state officers, despite their constitutional origin).
212
See Thomas, 262 N.Y.S. at 323 (challenging the notion
that voters have a constitutional right to vote for electors).
213
See id. at 326 (noting that electors' services are considered "purely ministerial"); Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P.
1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (stating that electors "are in effect no
more than messengers whose sole duty it is to certify and
transmit the election returns").
214
See Ray, 343 U.S. at 220, 228-29.
215
See id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (implying that
the Court's decision had had the effect of providing a legal
remedy for a faithless electoral vote).
216
See generally WINKLER, supra note 49. Winkler argues

that voting is deserving of First Amendment protection be-

cause it is, among other things, a form of political speech. Id.
Under that analysis, an electoral vote could properly be considered an apolitical act, particularly when it is bound by
state statute to reflect the general election results, and therefore not deserving of First Amendment protection. This reinforces the premise of some judicial decisions that electors exist to perform ministerial or clerical duties. See note 213,
supra.
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expectations of the American people 2 2 1 are dependent on states' abilities to control their electors. The Court would be hard-pressed to deny
that the above considerations are not compelling
state interests, as the concept has been understood since the Williams decision. Such compelling state interests, in unison, would undoubtedly
be a more than sufficient basis for denying electors First Amendment rights.

V.

CONCLUSION

While the First Amendment may have a role in
supporting the voting rights of the general public
on election day, it should not logically have any
impact on presidential electors, who, through an
evolutionary process that derives support from
the text of the Constitution, have been rendered
mere tools of the state. The basic matters of fairness and responsiveness that most American citizens take for granted are linked to the continued
functioning of the electoral college, the vitality of
which is linked to electors' adherence to the laws
of their respective states. If a state opts not to
binds its electors, that is its constitutional right.
Where states do bind their electors via their law,
however, electors should properly be at a loss for
words.

217

See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (quoting Button, 371

U.S. at 438).
218
See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (recognizing that states
have an interest in regulating elections in order to ensure
that "they are ... fair and honest and [that] some sort of
order, rather than chaos, [accompanies] the democratic
processes"). See also BEST, supra note 2, at 193 (noting how
the electoral college serves to keep fraudulent forces in
check).
219
See, e.g., ALTHOUSE, supra note 12, at 1012 (expressing
that "it is good to deny candidates the option of accumulating too many votes in one region while ignoring others");
CAtABRESI, supra note 1, at 1508-09 (stating that forcing candidates to run campaigns that are national in character prevents the unfair burdening of economic, political and social
minorities); HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 11, at 2543-44
(conceding that the electoral college is viewed by many as an
effective tool for encouraging "truly national campaigns").
221)
See, e.g., BEST, supra note 2, at 193-95, 204 (explaining
how the electoral college discourages contests of elections
and encourages electoral finality).
221
See Thomas, 262 N.Y.S. at 326 (discussing how citizens
have grown to expect the electoral vote to mirror their own
votes as cast on election day).

